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THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT'S DEVELOPING
DEFAMATION GUIDELINES: COLORADO ENTERS
THE QUAGMIRE
MICHAEL W. ANDERSON* AND JEFFREY S. PAGLIUCA**
INTRODUCTION
In 1964 the United States Supreme Court abolished the common law
principle that "whatever a man publishes he publishes at his peril"' and
imposed constitutional limitations, based upon the first amendment guaran-
tees of freedom of speech and of the press,2 on state libel laws. The Court's
attempt to establish a workable set of guidelines in the defamation area can-
not be classified as a model of clarity, and this lack of adequate guidance
prompted Colorado Supreme Court Justice Erickson to note that "the quag-
mire of confusion that has been created by the intervention of the Supreme
Court of the United States into the law of libel and slander on a constitu-
tional plane is regrettable."'3 The difficulty of reconciling the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press with the individual's inter-
est in protecting his reputation has not been confined to the Supreme Court,
however, and almost every state court that has tried to balance the two com-
peting interests has expressed some difficulty.
4
Since 1975, the Colorado Supreme Court has attempted to develop its
own guidelines to be used in defamation cases involving media defendants.
Colorado has attempted to define "actual malice"5 and has grappled with
the classifications of "public official," "public figure," 6 and "matters of pub-
lic interest."'7 In addition, Colorado has promulgated jury instructions to be
applied to defamation issues in civil cases.8 Unfortunately, the regrettable
"quagmire of confusion" that Justice Erickson complained of in Walker v.
Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. 9 has not been confined to the United States
Supreme Court. A review of Colorado case law indicates inconsistencies in
* Partner, White & Steele, P.C., Denver, Colorado; B.A., Colorado College, 1970; J.D.,
University of Colorado, 1973.
** B.A., Duke University, 1979; J.D., University of Denver, 1982.
1. King v. Woodfall, 20 Howell's State Trials 895, 902 (1770).
2. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 104, 538 P.2d 450, 460 (Erickson,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
4. See, e.g., La Rue, Living with Gertz: A fractical Look at Constitutional Libel Standards, 67
W. VA. L. REV. 287 (1981).
5. DiLeo v. Kolnow, 613 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1980); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.,
188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denid, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Manuel v. Ft. Collins Newspapers,
Inc., 42 Colo. App. 324, 599 P.2d 931 (1979), rev'don other grounds, 631 P.2d 114 (Colo. 1981).
6. DiLeo v. Koltnow, 613 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1980).
7. Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1025 (1975).
8. COL). JuRY INSTR. CIv. 2d, 22:1 to 22:26 (1980).
9. 188 Clo. 86, 538 P.2d 450 (1975).
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the area when media defendants are involved. These inconsistencies were
most recently highlighted in Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Publishing Co. ,1 a case
in which the Colorado Supreme Court misinterpreted "actual malice" and
disregarded the defamation standards recently adopted in the Colorado Jury
Instructions.
This article will briefly review the defamation standards applied to me-
dia defendants since New York Tines Co. v. Sullivan I " and their application in
Colorado when media defendants are involved. It will be argued that as a
result of Kuhn and the inconsistencies among the decisions of the Colorado
Court of Appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court, and the Colorado Jury In-
structions, it is almost impossible for a publisher or practitioner to accurately
predict the constitutional standard that will be required in media-related
defamation cases. It will be suggested that any decisions similar to Kuhn
could be reversed on appeal to the United States Supreme Court and that as
a result of Kuhn other areas of the Colorado defamation law are now
questionable.
I. ABROGATION OF COMMON LAW STRICT LIABILITY AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE
Beginning with the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
United States Supreme Court began to impose constitutional limitations on
state libel laws. In New York Times, the Court abrogated the common law
libel standard of strict liability and held that false statements or unjustified
comments published by the media regarding public officials were constitu-
tionally protected unless the material was published with "actual malice;"'
2
that is, with actual knowledge of the falsity or with a reckless disregard for
the truth or falsity of the material.1
3
In 1967, the New York Tines standard was expanded to include "public
figures," as well as "public officials."'1 4 The Court reasoned that because
public figures commanded a substantial amount of independent public in-
terest, similar to that commanded by public officials, they were required to
show that their defamers had acted with known falsity or reckless disregard
of the truth. 15 Three years later, in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. ,16 the Court
determined that the constitutional privilege should also be applied to situa-
tions in which the media was reporting matters of public or general interest,
even if a private individual was involved.'
7
During this period the United States Supreme Court also attempted to
define "actual malice." In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court
stated that actual malice could be proven by a showing of actual knowledge
10. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
12. Id at 279-80.
13. Id
14. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
15. Id at 155.
16. 403 U.S. 29 (1970). Rosenbloom was disapproved in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974).
17. ld at 52.
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of the falsity, or with a reckless disregard for the truth.' 8 The definition of
actual knowledge was fairly clear. Reckless disregard, however, was subject
to a number of interpretations and made a case-by-case review of lower
court decisions necessary.
Decisions following New York Times noted that there was a great distinc-
tion between "New York Times malice" and common law malice. The
Supreme Court noted that New York Times actual malice was "a term of art,
created to provide a convenient shorthand expression for the standard of
liability that must be established before a state may constitutionally permit
public officials to recover for libel in actions brought against publishers."' 9
In dealing with "reckless disregard" the Supreme Court first stated that reck-
less disregard could be found where the publisher possessed a "high degree of
awareness of. .. probable falsity."'20 The Court attempted to define reck-
less disregard further and, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Bulls,2 t noted that reck-
less disregard was "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily ad-
hered to by responsible publishers." 22 In St. Amant v. Thompson,23 the Court
held that in order to find reckless disregard, "[t]here must be sufficient evi-
dence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication. '24 The Court then gave examples
of reckless disregard: A story based on an unverified anonymous phone call,
or a situation in which the reporter had obvious reasons to doubt the verac-
ity of the informant or the accuracy of his reports. 25 Finally, in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. ,26 the Court reemphasized the definitions set forth in Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. and St. Amant and added that reckless disregard requires more
than mere proof of failure to investigate.
27
As one writer has noted, Gertz ended the Supreme Court's dominant
role in the establishment of the doctrine of constitutional privilege. 28 After
Gertz, however, certain generalizations can be made. It is recognized that a
media publisher is immune from liability for libel based upon pure comment
or opinion. 29 Further, public officials and public figures must prove actual
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth or probable falsity for lia-
18. 376 U.S. at 280.
19. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974).
20. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964).
21. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
22. Id at 155.
23. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
24. Id at 731.
25. Id at 732.
26. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
27. Id at 332.
28. "In Rosenbloom, the pendulum reached its outer limit in its swing away from the com-
mon law libel standard of strict liability." NiNrH ANNUAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW INSTITUTE
24 (1981). "In Gertz v. Robert Welch, . . . the Supreme Court, 'sensing that the balance be-
tween free speech and private reputation had tipped too far in the direction of free speech'
retreated to a limited extent from the enveloping protection of Rosenbloom, and extended an
invitation (not a command) to the states to fashion a similar limited retreat, if so advised." Id
(quoting Chapadeau v. Utica Observer Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199, 379 N.Y.S.2d 61
(1975)).
29. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 339-40.
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bility to be imposed on the media.3 0 If a media publisher makes false state-
ments of fact regarding a private individual and such statements are
published with fault and pose a substantial danger to reputation, the pub-
lisher may be held liable for defamation. 3 ' In cases involving purely private
plaintiffs, the states may define the appropriate standard of liability so long
as the media is not held strictly liable for defamatory statements.32 Finally,
in an action against the media, both presumed and punitive damages can be
recovered only upon a showing of actual malice.
3 3
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE IN COLORADO
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc. ,34 the Colorado Supreme Court, in
its first post-Gertz defamation opinion, addressed the issue of what standard
applies to a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory material that injured a
private individual and that related to a matter of public concern. The court
specifically adopted the rule of the plurality in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 35
and held that in matters involving public concern, a media publisher would
be liable to the person defamed if he knew the statement was false or if the
,statement was made with reckless disregard for the truth.3 6 Significantly,
the court adopted the rule of Rosenbloom, but did not adopt the definition of
"reckless disregard" enunciated in St. Amant and reaffirmed in Rosenbloom.37
The Walker court, in interpreting St. Amant, stated that to find reckless disre-
gard under St. Amant there had to be sufficient evidence to permit the con-
clusion that the defendant had, in fact, entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of the publication. 38 This subjective standard was rejected as a corol-
lary or amendment to the Rosenbloom definition.39 The Walker court did
state that the St. Amant test of subjective serious doubt, taken in conjunction
with the definition of reckless disregard, had merit, because it provided more
concrete guidelines to a jury, but that by consensus the court felt that it
would not approve the St. Amant definition "at this time" because the term
"reckless disregard" had already been applied in the tort field in Colorado. 4°
It is important to note, however, that the Walker case dealt with the
definition of "actual malice" in the context of a private individual suing a
media defendant. Under Gertz, the Colorado Supreme Court was free to
adopt any standard it wished so long as strict liability was not imposed. The
court rejected the simple negligence test proposed by Justice Harlan in Rosen-
bloom 4 ' and adopted by many states,42 because a "simple negligence rule
30. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 731.
31. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 347-48.
32. Id at 347.
33. Id at 349.
34. 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cefl. dented, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
35. 402 U.S. 29 (1971).
36. 188 Colo. at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457.
37. Id at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
38. Id
39. Id
40. Id at 99, 538 P.2d at 457.
41. 403 U.S. at 62. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
42. See, e.g., Brewer v. Memphis Publishing Co., 626 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. dented,
452 U.S. 962 (1981); Mills v. Kingsport Time News, 475 F. Supp. 1005 (W.D. Va. 1979);
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would cast such a chilling effect upon the news media that it would print
insufficient facts in order to protect against libel actions; and this ... insuffi-
ciency would be more harmful to the public interest than the possibility of
lack of adequate compensation to a defamation-injured private individ-
ual."'43 The standard of proof adopted by the court in Walker can be classi-
fied as one of gross negligence. Although the court rejected St. Amant, as it
was free to do in this context under Gertz, it also interpreted St. Amant.4
This interpretation was to form the basis for the standard to be applied to
public persons in later cases and in the Colorado Jury Instructions.
In Manuel o. Ft. Colh'ns Newspapers, Inc. ,45 the question of what standard
should apply when a media publisher is sued by a public official or a public
figure was addressed for the first time in Colorado by the court of appeals.
In dealing with the issue of whether Ft. Collins Newspapers, Inc. published
defamatory remarks, the court of appeals applied St. Amant and held that
because the newspaper did not entertain serious doubts as to the truth of the
publication there could be no showing of actual malice.4 6 In addition, the
court noted that a failure to investigate or mere negligence on the part of a
reporter or publisher was insufficient to show reckless disregard.4 7 Thus,
Judge Van Cise ruled that summary judgment should have been entered for
the defendants. 48  The Colorado Supreme Court, however, reversed the
lower court's decision on other grounds, holding that in public official defa-
mation actions, the denial of a summary judgment motion may not be con-
sidered on an appeal from a final judgment entered after a trial on the
merits.49 The Colorado Supreme Court did not, however, discuss the lower
court's application of the St. Amant definition of reckless conduct.
One year after the court of appeals' decision in Manuel, the Colorado
Supreme Court had an opportunity to consider the standard to be applied
when a public official or public figure institutes a defamation action against
a media defendant. In DiLeo v. Koltnow 50 the court noted that "a public
Mathis v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 455 F. Supp. 406 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Peagler v. Phoenix
Newspapers, 144 Ariz. 304, 560 P.2d 1216 (1977); Bodrill v. Arkansas Democrat, 265 Ark. 628,
590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert. denie-d, 444 U.S. 1076 (1980); Widener v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Corp., 75
Cal. App. 3d 415, 142 Cal. Rptr. 304 (1977), cert. dented, 436 U.S. 918 (1978); Phillips v. Evening
Star Newspaper Co., 424 A.2d 78 (D.C. 1980); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56
Hawaii 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Truman v. Wood, 62 Ill. 2d 184, 340 N.E.2d 292 (1975);
Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 216 Kan. 223, 531 P.2d 76 (1975); E.W. Scripps Co. v.
Cholomondelay, 569 S.W.2d 700 (Ky. 1978); Jacron Sales v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d
688 (1976); Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Thomas
H. Malony & Sons v. E.W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), ceri. denied,
423 U.S. 883 (1975); Martin v. Griffin Television, 549 P.2d 85 (Okla. 1976); Memphis Publish-
ing Co. v. Nichols, 569 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1978); Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, 541 S.W.2d 809
(Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Seegmiller v. KSL, 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981);
Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
43. 188 Colo. at 99, 538 P.2d at 458.
44. Id at 98-99, 538 P.2d at 457.
45. 42 Colo. App. 324, 599 P.2d 931 (1979), rev'd on other groundr, 631 P.2d 1114 (Colo.
1981).
46. Id at 327, 599 P.2d at 933.
47. Id
48. Id at 329, 599 P.2d at 935.
49. 631 P.2d 1114 (Colo. 1981).
50. 613 P.2d 318 (Colo. 1980).
1982]
DENVER LAW JOURJAL
official can only recover damages for a defamatory statement concerning his
official conduct by presenting clear and convincing proof that the statement
was made with actual malice."'5 1 According to Chief Justice Hodges, New
York Times actual malice meant "that the defamatory statement was known
to be false or was made with reckless disregard of whether it was true or
false."'5 2 In defining reckless disregard the court gave the accepted defini-
tion: "Reckless disregard has subsequently been explained as requiring suffi-
cient evidence that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the
truth of the published statement. '5 3 The court appears to have approved
the St. Amant definition of reckless disregard in its finding that "the defend-
ants did not publish the article. . . with actual malice as above-defined.
'54
The subjective test has been applied many times by lower courts since
the St. Amant decision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated unequivo-
cally that "[w]hile verification of the facts remains an important reporting
standard, a reporter, without a high degree of awareness of their probable
falsity, may rely on statements made by a single source even though they
reflect only one side of the story without fear of libel prosecution. . .. "55
Although the courts frown on a failure to verify factual assertions, liabil-
ity is not generally imposed unless there is evidence of calculated falsehood.
In Ga//man v. Carnes,56 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that a substan-
dard investigation, in which the reporter failed to contact all of the parties
involved, "does not in itself establish bad faith."'57 The United States
Supreme Court has itself noted that "mere proof of failure to investigate,
without more, cannot establish reckless disregard for the truth."5 8
The issue, then, is not whether prudence requires a reporter to verify his
assumptions before distributing a story. Rather, it is whether the reporter
"in fact seriously doubted the accuracy of his assumption."'5 9 Thus, as the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "the constitutional definition of mal-
ice is more concerned with showing the publisher's subjective reckless disre-
gard for accuracy."
' 6
The United States Supreme Court recently emphasized the absolute ne-
cessity of the reporter's subjective state of mind in Herbert v. Lando.6 1 In Her-
bert, the issue was whether, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 a
plaintiff could, through the use of depositions, discover the author's state of
mind at the time of publication. The Supreme Court held that because
proof of actual malice would be impossible if the editorial process were not
subject to discovery, the media could not claim editorial privilege in a defa-
51. Id at 321.
52. Id
53. Id at 321, n.4.
54. Id at 321.
55. New York Times Co. v. Conner, 365 F.2d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 1966).
56. 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973).
57. Id at 994, 497 S.W.2d at 51 (quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 733).
58. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 332.
59. Waskow v. Associated Press, 462 F.2d 1173, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
60. Orr v. Argos-Press, 586 F.2d 1108, 1116 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denid, 440 U.S. 960 (1979).
61. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
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mation action. 63 The Court noted that "in every or almost every case, the
plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a false publication
attended by some degree of culpability on the part of the publisher. '64 This
degree of culpability would be found, according to the Court, in circum-
stances of knowing falsity or in which the "defendant in fact entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. ' 65 Quoting Gertz and Si.
Amant, the Court added that "such subjective awareness of probable falsity
. ..may be found if 'there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the
informant or the accuracy of his reports.' "66
Inquiry into the subjective state of mind of a media defendant, then, is
an essential element of any media defamation case. And, as a result of the
Colorado decisions of Walker, Manuel, and DiLeo, an assumption could be
made that Colorado has accepted the above definition of reckless disregard.
This assumption is strengthened by the second edition of the Colorado Jury
Instructions.
Colorado Jury Instruction 22:3 defines reckless disregard where the
plaintiff is a public official or public person. The instruction states:
A statement is published with reckless disregard when, at the
time of publication, the person publishing it has knowledge of facts
that indicate to him that the statement is probably false and he has
serious doubts as to its truth, but nevertheless publishes it.
The failure to exercise reasonable care before publication to
discover the truth or falsity of information does not alone consti-
tute a reckless disregard of whether the statement was false or
not.
6 7
The commentary to the Jury Instructions traces the history of the first
amendment privilege from New York Tines to Walker and their rejection of
the simple negligence standard. 68 The commentary deals directly with the
role of St. Amant and adopts the St. Amant definition of reckless disregard.
69
The requirement that the publisher have subjective knowledge of falsity or
serious doubts as to the truth is limited to cases in which the plaintiff is a
public figure.
70
Where the plaintiff is a private person, Instruction 22:4 applies:
A statement is published with reckless disregard when, at the
time of publication, the person publishing it has knowledge of facts
that indicate to him that the statement is probably false but never-
theless publishes it with indifference to the consequences.
The failure to exercise reasonable care before publication to
discover the truth or falsity of information does not alone consti-
tute reckless disregard of whether the statement is false or not. 71
63. 441 U.S. at 170.
64. Id. at 176.
65. Id. at 156.
66. Id at 156-57.
67. COLO. JURY INSTR. Civ. 2d 22:3 (1980).
68. Id, Commentary at 144-45.
69. Id
70. Id, Commentary at 144.
71. Id at 22:4.
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The Jury Instructions, then, make a distinction between reckless disre-
gard in defamation cases involving public figures and those involving private
individuals. The instructions specifically adopt the St. Amant standard where
public officials are involved. The failure to exercise reasonable care in publi-
cation or the failure to discover the truth or falsity of the information does
not lead to liability in this context. Rather, clear and convincing evidence
must be presented that the defendant had serious doubts as to the truth of
the statement and also knew that the statement was probably false. Where a
private person sues a media defendant, however, there is a requirement of
knowledge of facts that the statement was probably false, but no require-
ment as to serious doubt on behalf of the defendant.
Until October 2, 1981, Colorado defamation law in this area could be
summarized as follows: In matters of public or general concern a private
individual alleging defamatory remarks by the media must show knowing
falsity or gross negligence on the part of the media in the publication of the
defamatory material. In situations in which a public figure or public official
sues the media for defamatory remarks, proof of actual malice is more diffi-
cult, because reckless disregard in cases involving public individuals requires
that the defendant have had serious doubts as to the truth of the published
statements. However, with the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Kuhn
v. Tribune-Republican Publishhng Co. ,72 the above generalizations are no longer
valid.
III. KUHN v TRIBUNE-REPUBLICAN PUBLISHING Co.: COLORADO ENTERS
THE QUAGMIRE
On January 8, 1976, the Greeley Tribune published an article concern-
ing the Greeley Recreation Department's ski program. The article reported
that two ski areas sent complimentary season lift passes to the Recreation
Department and implied that the two areas were included in the city's ski
program because they provided ski passes for the personal use of the Director
of the Recreation Department, the City Manager, and the Director of the ski
program.
73
The reporter of the article, John Seelmeyer, spent approximately two
hours investigating the story and thirty minutes writing it. The investigation
consisted of telephone calls to various officials involved with the ski program,
the City Manager, two ski shops, Colorado Ski Country-U.S.A., the two ski
areas in question, and the owner of the Shark Tooth Ski Area. 74 It does not
appear that Seelmeyer knew that any of the information was false. 75 Thus,
the key issue at trial was whether the Tribune published with reckless disre-
gard. A jury found that the newspaper had in fact published with reckless
disregard of the truth or falsity of the story and awarded a verdict against
the newspaper.
72. 637 P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
73. Id at 316.
74. Id at 317-18.
75. Kuhn v. Tribune-Republican Publishing Co., 637 P.2d 395, 396 (Colo. App.), revd, 637
P.2d 315 (Colo. 1981).
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After reviewing the record, however, the court of appeals noted that
"the article was substantially accurate, and, aside from some estimated dol-
lar figures which proved to be somewhat high but still sizeable, there were no
factual errors of any consequence." 7 6 Further, the court held that "[tihere
was no showing of knowledge of falsity or serious doubts as to the truth. At
most, plaintiffs' case was that the reporter did not ask enough questions or go
far enough in his investigation. That does not, however, constitute the 'reck-
less disregard' that the First Amendment requires."' 77 The court concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their constitutional burden and that sum-
mary judgment or a directed verdict should have been entered in favor of
the newspaper.
78
The decision by the court of appeals was reversed by the Colorado
Supreme Court. 79 Justice Dubofsky, writing for the majority, held that Seel-
meyer's failure to attempt to verify or refute the information previously ob-
tained evidenced a reckless disregard for the truth.8 0 Justice Dubofsky
equated a failure to verify statements with fabrication and noted that when
one acts as Seelmeyer had, he "knowingly risks the likelihood that the state-
ments and inferences are false and thereby forfeits First Amendment protec-
tions."8" Thus, the majority concluded that the article was not entitled to
constitutional protection, and reinstated the jury verdict.
8 2
As the dissent makes clear, however, the majority, by failing to deal
with the subjective knowledge requirement of St. Amant, incorrectly defined
reckless disregard. 83 Relying on St. Amant and Herbert, the dissent correctly
focused on "the defendant's conduct and state of mind at the time of publi-
cation."8 4 Justice Rovira noted that although the publication contained
some inaccurate and misleading statements, "the publication of false facts is
not actionable against a defendant who had no knowledge of the falsity or
probable falsity of the underlying facts at the time of publication. '8 5 Be-
cause the dissent found no showing of a conscious awareness of probable
falsity as required by St. Amant, the dissent would have affirmed the judg-
ment of the court of appeals.
8 6
IV. EFFECTS OF THE KUHN DECISION
The Kuhn decision has significantly muddied the doctrine of constitu-
tional privilege in Colorado and could create a number of problems for both
publishers and practitioners. By its failure to apply the St. Amant subjective
knowledge test, the Colorado Supreme Court has created a different defini-
tion of reckless disregard than that mandated by decisions of the United
76. 637 P.2d at 396.
77. Id
78. Id
79. 637 P.2d 315.
80. Id at 319.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id at 324 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
84. Id at 323.
85. Id
86. Id at 324.
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States Supreme Court. Any similarly decided cases are therefore appealable
and reversible at the United States Supreme Court level. Because the Colo-
rado Court of Appeals and the Colorado Jury Instructions have correctly
interpreted reckless disregard,8 7 it is possible that Colorado district courts
and the court of appeals will continue to apply the St. Amant standard and
will continue to be incorrectly reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court. If
the lower courts attempt to follow Kuhn, however, it is submitted that be-
cause of the Colorado Jury Instructions and prior case law, both of which
apply the St. Amant subjective standard, nothing but confusion will result.
Finally, the Kuhn decision casts doubts on whether the gross negligence stan-
dard which was held to apply to private plaintiffs in Walker v. Colorado Springs
Sun, Inc. is still viable.
A. Possible Appeal and Reversal of Similar Decisions
In dealing with public figures or public officials, the states are still con-
trolled by the constitutional privilege that demands knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard. The very specific issue, when dealing with a potential
challenge to the Kuhn-Colorado defamation standard, is whether reckless dis-
regard demands proof of the media's knowledge of falsity or serious doubts
as to the truth of the publication. The court of appeals and the Colorado
Jury Instructions adopt the Gertz and St. Amant standard and, as the embodi-
ment of Colorado and United States constitutional law, appear to be correct.
The Colorado Supreme Court in Kuhn, believed that the jury clearly
could have been convinced that the defendant evidenced a reckless disregard
for the truth or falsity of the publication.8 The court specifically held that
the publication failed to meet the standard set down by New York Times and
its progeny:
Here, ajury could reasonably find that the publication failed even
to meet this generous standard. [The reporter] admitted that he
had no bases for most of his erroneous statements, and that he
faiied to take the time to corroborate allegations made in the arti-
cle, even though no particular urgency existed as to the time of
publication. Actual malice may be inferred by a finder of fact if an
investigation is grossly inadequate.
89
It is interesting to note that the constitutional standard was set out and
that immediately thereafter the reference by the Colorado Supreme Court
was in regard to the failure to corroborate allegations. The issue of the sub-
jective knowledge of the reporter, however, was not dealt with. The court
also dealt with the reporter's failure to pursue obvious available sources and
concluded that this type of evidence can establish reckless disregard for the
truth 9 0
The requirement of St. Amant, that the reporter or publisher entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of the statements, is not considered in the Kuhn
87. See supra text accompanying notes 34-71.
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decision. The focus upon reporting inadequacies or the mere negligence of
the reporter or publisher is "constitutionally insufficient to show the reckless-
ness that is required ... ."91 The dissent recognized that there was no
showing that the reporter had knowledge of the falsity or serious doubts
about the article's truth before publication, and specifically noted that reck-
less disregard is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent person
would have published, or would have investigated before publishing, but
that reckless disregard must reflect a conscious awareness of probable fal-
sity.92 In addition, the dissent correctly pointed out that the test of actual
malice is whether the defendant knew or had reason to suspect that his pub-
lication was false. 93 Any inquiry, then, must focus on the defendant's con-
duct and state of mind at the time of publication.
This constitutional standard is not adopted by the majority opinion
and, as such, Kuhn would raise a specific and narrow appealable issue to the
United States Supreme Court. The majority opinion in Kuhn focuses on
reporting procedures and not on the actual knowledge of the reporter or
publisher. A review of the Colorado Supreme Court's summary of facts con-
sidered to be germane to the constitutional issue arguably leads to the con-
clusion that the reporter acted with subjective knowledge of falsity.
Reference is made by the majority to the fact that the story itself was worded
to imply that recreational officials had personally accepted the passes when,
at the same time, the reporter knew that the passes were given to the Recrea-
tion Department. 9 4 This testimony goes to the heart of the defamation as-
serted in Kuhn, but without the supreme court's specific review of the
reporter's knowledge of falsity, it is difficult to know if in fact the St. Amant
standard could have been applied to find liability against the Kuhn defend-
ants. At the very least, the Colorado Supreme Court chose either not to
recognize the St. Amant requirement or not to deal with the requirement as it
relates to Kuhn. Because a finding of subjective knowledge of probable fal-
sity is required where a public person sues a media defendant, the court's
failure to deal with the issue is appealable and reversible at the United
States Supreme Court level.
B. Interpretation of Reckless Disregard in the Colorado Court of Appeals and the
Colorado Supreme Court
It is obvious that a significant difference of opinion regarding the defini-
tion of reckless disregard exists between the Colorado Court of Appeals and
the Colorado Supreme Court. This difference of opinion is highlighted in
Kuhn, where the two courts, reviewing the same record, came to conclusions
which were entirely opposite. Although it is not unusual for appellate courts
to disagree, in this situation a problem arises because the court of appeals
appears to be correct in its interpretation of reckless disregard.
91. COLO. JURY INSTR. Civ. 2d 22:3 (1980) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun,
Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975)).
92. 637 P.2d at 322-23 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
93. I d at 323.
94. Id at 318.
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Because a case-by-case determination must be made in this area of defa-
mation law, it is entirely possible that each reckless disregard case decided by
the Colorado Court of Appeals, correctly applying United States Supreme
Court standards, will be overruled by the Colorado Supreme Court. If, like
Kuhn, the case is not appealed to the United States Supreme Court for a
clarification of the term "reckless disregard," the cycle could continue, re-
sulting in a waste of time, money, and a further misapplication of the law.
The Colorado Jury Instructions, recently adopted by the Colorado
Supreme Court, support the position of the court of appeals. Thus, the Kuhn
decision will also create problems in the application of these jury instructions
at the trial court level.
C. Continued Viabthy of Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc.
As a result of the Kuhn decision, Colorado's future treatment of private
plaintiffs in media defamation cases must also be questioned. In Walker v.
Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., the court rejected a simple negligence test and in-
stead adopted the rule of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia without the subjective
qualification of St. Amant. 95 This standard is one of gross negligence. The
Colorado Jury Instructions point out that in this situation, reckless disregard
is knowledge that the statement is probably false, but has been published
with indifference to the consequences. There is no requirement that the de-
fendant have serious doubts as to the truth.96 This standard is in reality no
different than the one applied by the Colorado Supreme Court in Kuhn. In
Kuhn, the court inferred reckless disregard from inadequate investigation
without dealing with the reporter's subjective statement of mind. In so do-
ing, it applied the test supposedly reserved for private persons.
Aside from constitutional questions, Kuhn raises the issue of what stan-
dard will be applied in cases involving private individuals. The rationale
behind the different standards is clear. Private individuals are not in the
public eye and do not willingly expose themselves to public scrutiny. Be-
cause private individuals do not command the attention of the media, they
have little chance to correct false statements. Finally, the courts recognize
the role played by the media as a public "watchdog" where government
officials are concerned. As a result, the courts have afforded the media
greater protection against suits by public persons and have made it easier for
a private individual to recover for libel. 9 7 The decision has been basically
one of public policy. The courts have concluded that because of their posi-
tion in our society, public persons are afforded less protection from media
defamation. 98
As a result of Kuhn, however, it can be argued that in Colorado there is
no difference between suits brought by private individuals and those
brought by public persons. One could speculate that the Walker gross negli-
95. 188 Colo. at 98, 538 P.2d at 457.
96. COLO. JURY INSTR. Civ. 2d 22:4; see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727; supra
text accompanying notes 31-44.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 12-17, 30-32.
98. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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gence standard is no longer valid and that a simple negligence test such as
that proposed by Justice Erickson but rejected by the majority in Walker will
be applied in the future.
CONCLUSION
In Kuhn v. Tribune Republican Publishing Co., the Colorado Supreme Court
seriously confused the law of defamation in Colorado. From the standpoint
of a practitioner, publisher, or trial judge it is unclear what standards will
apply to a media defendant in defamation cases.
In Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., the Colorado Supreme Court's first
media defamation decision after the establishment of constitutional privi-
lege, Justice Groves expressed concern over a decision that would "cast such
a chilling effect upon the news media that it would print insufficient facts in
order to protect itself against libel actions. . .. "99 The court in Walker re-
jected a simple negligence standard and observed that "the vagueness of the
negligence standard itself, would create a strong impetus toward self censor-
ship, which the First Amendment cannot tolerate." 10 0 It is hoped that the
"regrettable quagmire of confusion" created by the court by its decision in
Kuhn has not significantly impaired first amendment rights in Colorado.
99. 188 Colo. at 100, 538 P.2d at 458 (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 50).
100. Id (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 50).
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